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The Transfer Space 
Abstract 
 
Within the transfer space substrates (material and energy) are selfishly 
transferred from source to sink to optimize productivity of one or both 
sides. Under certain conditions this will lead to a productivity increase of 
the whole ensemble. The present day view that cooperation is the most 
productive interaction between organisms is an illusion. Whenever two 
not identically equipped parties meet with the potential to exchange 
substrates one party will become a source and the other a sink. This is 
realistically called exploitation. The outcome depends on the relation 
between fix cost, variable cost, productivity and affinity. Brute force and 
educational conditioning used by the sink take advantage of emotions to 
hide the real size of the cost to the exploited party. In case the transfer of 
substrates leads to increased productivity parts of the productivity might 
be reinvested to keep the exploited party. The lasting relationship is 
called wise exploitation. Wise exploitation may last for one or many 
generations depending on the use of brute force, education or breeding. 
All actions have to be viewed under thermodynamic considerations and 
the benefit must always exceed the cost to maintain a stable system. 
This hypothesis explains observations from catalytic networks to 
societies. In addition, the transfer space is also a model to understand 
the decision process under external influence in a single economic entity. 
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Introduction 
 
Cooperation and prisoners´ dilemma 
What is cooperation? Many definitions exist in the different fields of 
research. They all speak of joint interactions and working together of two 
parties for mutual benefits. But this kind of behaviour is hardly - if at all - 
observed. The reason is prisoners´ dilemma. 
 
Axelrod and Hamilton (Axelrod, R. and Hamilton, W. D., 1981) use the 
following and generally accepted matrix to explain prisoners´ dilemma 
(Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1 
 
Figure 1. Prisoners´ dilemma, an example. 
 
From arbitrary values they learn that successful exploitation (D) of a 
source may earn more for the sink than cooperation (D>C). The best 
productivity or fitness has the ensemble (Player A+B) if both parties 
cooperate (C+C>C+D>D+D). This is the prisoners´ dilemma – it would 
be better to cooperate, but the temptation to exploit someone or the 
danger of being exploited prevents cooperation (P>S though 
2R>T+S>P+P). As defect is stable (D+D; a Nash equilibrium) it is 
puzzling to many authors why help between two organisms is 
observable. One reason is genetic relation – kin selection (Hamilton, 
W.D., 1964). 
 
An unanswered question in this example is where does the productivity 
come from and why should the productivity in cooperation (C+C) be 
higher than in exploitation (C+D)? This view has evolved a little (Nowak, 
M. A., 2006). This author writes: “a cooperator is someone who pays a 
cost, c for another individual to receive a benefit, b. A defector has no 
cost and does not deal out benefits.” To assume that something (a 
benefit) can only come from something else (a cost) is a step forward. 
However such behaviour (giving) is difficult to understand. Giving is 
regarded as an altruistic action – it pays in terms of evolution only for 
offspring and other genetic relation. Complex evolutionary epicycles are 
invented to transfer the genetically founded behaviour altruism and kin 
selection to group selection with no genetic foundation (“A group of 
cooperators might be more successful than a group of defectors”, same 
author). The question is not answered where this additional fitness 
(productivity) has its source. The answer to this question is important as 
we live under the law of mass and energy conservation - one of the most 
important empirical laws and philosophic meaningful concepts. 
 
As the values are arbitrary other outcomes are possible and would be 
worth to be discussed. A general form should be helpful. Turner and 
Chao (Turner, P. E. and Chao. L., 1999) use an interesting general form 
to explain prisoners´ dilemma (Figure 2). They introduce a further 
simplification: one side gives and one side takes, a transfer is realized. 
 
Figure 2 
 
Figure 2. Prisoners´ dilemma, one side gives (–s1) and one side takes (+s2).  
 
Using the same values as Axelrod and Hamilton we obtain the same 
result. Prisoners´ dilemma is P>S though 2R>T+S>P+P. In this new 
general form prisoners´ dilemma equals 1-s1<1-c. Cooperation (1=1) is 
doing better than exploitation (1-s1<1+s2). We could say: 1+1>1- s1+1+s2. 
 
The transfer space 
What does the generalization (prisoners´ dilemma: c<s1; cooperation is 
better than exploitation: 0>s2-s1 = s2<s1) teach?  
 
It seems there are three variables: s1, s2 and c and they are considered 
independent because the used values were arbitrary. Three independent 
variables may be best arranged in a three dimensional space, the 
transfer space (Figure 3). The size comparison of these variables may 
teach something like in prisoners´ dilemma (not giving, c<s1). The pair 
wise combinations of three variables (c<s1, c>s1, s2<s1, s2>s1, s2>c, s2<c) 
form the surface of the transfer space. 
 
Figure 3 
 
Figure 3. The transfer is space formed by the variables c, s1 and s2. The origin of the 
transfer space is where the red lines meet; c=s1=s2=0. The red lines are s2=s1, c=s1 
and s2=c. 
 
What do the variables mean? 
• The variable c is the loss if a transfer does not take place. This 
variable seems to be some kind of fix cost – always present. It is a fix 
cost for both sides. This fix cost is not necessarily of the same size for 
player A and player B but will be connected by a factor or an equation. 
• Although one substrate is transferred the loss to one party is not 
necessarily identical with the gain to the other party (s2>s1, s2<s1)! The 
transferred substrate will however couple s1 and s2. 
• The variable s1 contains the loss of one party (source). It consists of 
the fix cost (the essence of a fix cost is the ubiquity; c), the variable 
cost that is connected to the lost substrate (S) and the loss in 
productivity (p) with this lost substrate. 
• The variable s2 contains the gain of the other party (sink). It consists of 
the fix cost (c), the variable cost that is connected to the gained 
substrate (S) and the gain in productivity (p) with this substrate. 
• Productivity (p) is a saturation function. At high saturation the gain in 
productivity is small compared to low saturation for the same amount 
of substrate (S). At high saturation the productivity with this substrate 
may be less earning than the variable cost for this substrate.  
• Due to the general limitedness of resources biological and economic 
systems are usually not equally saturated – they are not Pareto 
efficient!  
• The substrate (S) is a variable cost with a linear dependence.   
• s1=c+S+p and s2=c+S+p. This helps to understand why there is 
“giving”, “not giving”, “taking” and “not taking” without genetically 
founded altruism involved.    
 
 giving:   c>s1 equals c>c+S+p or 0>S+p 
 not giving:  c<s1 equals c<c+S+p or 0<S+p 
 taking:   s2>c equals c+S+p>c or S+p>0 
 not taking:  s2<c equals c+S+p<c or S+p<0 
 
Not giving, 0<S+p: The source would lose a highly productive (+p) 
substrate (S). As long as the source is uninfluenced and reasonable it 
will not give the valuable substrate.   
 
Taking, S+p>0: The sink will take the substrate (S) because it will 
make a positive productivity (+p) contribution. 
 
As S is always a positive value, p must be a large negative value (-p) 
in the case of “giving” (0>S+p) and “not taking” (S+p<0).  
 
Giving, 0>S+p: A negative productivity loss is a relative productivity 
gain. Giving will increase the productivity! Giving will reduce variable 
cost that does not pay. Giving is a selfish act and will increase the 
productivity via reducing the amount of substrate not earning the 
variable cost at high saturation. This idea is important for two reasons. 
Giving is reasonable, selfish and economically founded. Giving is not a 
sacrifice. It is now independent of genetic relation. 
 
Not taking, S+p<0: A negative productivity gain is a productivity loss. 
The second party will not take because a loss in productivity would be 
realized. Increasing the substrate (increase variable cost) at high 
saturation will decrease the relative productivity. This idea is important 
for two reasons. Not taking is not generous, it is reasonable. Not taking 
can prevent a decline of the productivity. It is independent now of 
genetic relation. 
 
Giving, giving not, taking and taking not: These 4 types of behaviour 
meet in the three dimensional complex transfer space. The outcome of 
interactions depends on the physiological, emotional, informational 
and genetic condition of the parties. 
• The saturating production functions in source and sink determine 
whether the transfer s1 to s2 will be productive (s2>s1) or consumptive 
(s2<s1). The effect is that the ensemble will be more or less productive 
than the sum of the single entities.  
• The variables c, S and p will be of typical size for a species/population 
and vary slightly between individuals. 
• The value of the fix cost is considered absolute indispensable by sink 
or source. The value of the variable cost depends on the contribution 
to the productivity (positive or negative). 
• The indispensable fix cost (c) is connected to indispensable substrates 
and an indispensable productivity with these substrates. This 
productivity may or may not be saturated. But the degree of this 
saturation will determine the value of the lost or additional productivity 
with the variable cost (S) in source and sink. 
• Source and sink are the projection of the transfer space on one side 
(c-s1 and c-s2). The outcome for the system (s2-s1) is a projection of 
the transfer space on the ground. The feature of the ensemble 
manifests within the transfer space and depends on source and sink. 
• Giving and taking, brute force or informational influence on source and 
sink will change the perception of c, s1 (c+S+p) and s2 (c+S+p). This 
can be interpreted either as a deformation of the transfer space or a 
movement of source and sink along the sides of the transfer space. 
• Now we can give names to the different situations: 
c<s1:   prisoners´ dilemma; avoided exploitation, giving will decrease 
source productivity 
c>s1:  tolerated exploitation, giving improves source productivity 
s2<s1:  consumptive exploitation, the system looses productivity 
s2>s1:  productive exploitation, the system gains productivity 
s2>c:  cost efficient exploitation, taking will increase sink productivity 
s2<c:  costing exploitation, taking will decrease sink productivity 
1-1=0: cooperation, the starting point c=s1=s2=0 
Discussion  
 
I suggest a new perspective to look at two parties capable to exchange 
substrates. This idea explains exchange related behaviour on different 
levels of complexity like enzymes, cells (many enzymes), organisms 
(many cells) and societies (many organisms) and suggests a source of 
productivity to fuel group selection without gene or moral founded 
altruism. Here a purely selfish founded explanation is introduced. The 
ensemble within the space is a complex entity. Therefore, it is better to 
look at first at the surface of the transfer space and its origin. 
 
• Cooperation, the entry point into the transfer space: 
Now cooperation formally is the entry point into the transfer space. In 
cooperation nothing is transferred (s1=s2=0) at no cost (c=0) but the two 
parties are able to exchange. What is usually implied using the word 
cooperation is a point of the coordinates s2>>s1, s1≈0, c≈0. In this point 
productivity is generated from a small loss (transfer) at negligible cost 
and part of the gain is shared. This will be explained later and is called 
wise exploitation. 
 
• Productive and consumptive exploitation; the surface s2-s1: 
Giving and taking create or destroy productivity within the ensemble. The 
productivity gain s2>s1 is the intrinsic power source for the system and is 
called productive exploitation. The transfer of one substrate from a 
saturated condition to an unsaturated condition is the reason for the 
increase in productivity (Figure 4). The increased productivity is realized 
in the sink. The sink controls the gain and this is the maximal reward. 
The ensemble of sink and source together has a better productivity then 
the sum of both parties alone. This is an advantage to the group but on 
cost of the source. The productivity of the source will decrease and 
finally the source will be lost. The advantage to the sink and the group is 
gone. The sink will need new exploitable source from anywhere else. 
The transfer from an unsaturated condition to a saturated condition will 
lead to a decrease in productivity (s2<s1) and is called consumptive 
exploitation (Figure 4). The smaller productivity is realized and controlled 
by the sink. A reward is still obtained but the catch to the sink is smaller 
than the loss to the source. But it is still an advantage to the sink. The 
ensemble of sink and source together has a smaller productivity then the 
sum of both parties alone. This is a disadvantage to the group and in 
addition on cost of the source. The productivity of the source and the 
group will decrease very fast and finally the source will be lost. The sink 
will need new exploitable source from anywhere else. 
 
Figure 4 
 
Figure 4. An example: In case A a source has a fix cost (c) and a variable substrate 
cost (S) and a certain productivity (1p) with this amount of substrate. In a second 
case (B) a different source has the same fix (c) and variable cost (S) as A, but at a 
tenfold productivity (10p) with this amount of substrate. The same amount of 
substrate (S) in both cases is transferred to the same sink. With the same amount of 
substrate the sink may have a productivity of 5p at identical fix and variable cost. The 
ensemble AC will have a fivefold increased productivity. The productivity of the 
ensemble BC however is cut by half. AC is a productive transfer (s2>s1), BC is a 
consumptive transfer (s2<s1). 
 
• Brute force, the surface c-s1: 
In prisoners´ dilemma nothing is transferred because not giving is 
cheaper (c<s1). Only the anyway spent fix cost (c) but no additional 
highly productive substrate is lost. Brute force (bf) will increase the cost 
of “not giving”. To withstand the force the amount of indispensable cost 
(c) must be increased. The size relation will therefore change. Starting at 
c<s1 the increase will finally exceed c=s1 (c+bf>s1) now variable cost is 
given to optimize own productivity. Both sides may be hurt seriously as 
bf is a risky investment. But once bf is effective cheap threatening will 
make the subdominant party give. Threatening evokes an emotion called 
fear (f). Fear will hide the true cost of giving (s1) (Figure 5).  
 
Figure 5 
 
Figure 5. At first brute force (bf, blue arrow) will increase the fix cost (c) for the 
subdominant party. Giving (orange arrow) is induced as variable cost no longer pay 
at that relationship between fix cost, variable cost and productivity. Later fear is 
sufficient. Fear (blue arrow, f) hides the true cost s1 and induces giving (orange 
arrow) at lower fix cost. The red line separates c>s1 and c<s1. 
The intensity of brute force and fear correlate directly to the amount 
given. The productivity with the present variable cost and fix cost does 
not pay the defence. Costing variable cost is given to increase 
productivity. Even a new assessment of the fix cost may take place and 
a part of the fix cost is transformed to a variable cost and given, too. 
 
• Education, the surface c-s1: 
Education is used in intelligent species. It is difficult to determine the true 
degree of saturation in a complex organism. Manifold, different and 
complex internal and external information has to be processed. This 
processing can be manipulated through appropriate additional 
information. Education is an investment by one party to influence the 
behaviour of a second party. Education as external information is 
capable to change the perception of the relation between fix cost (c), 
variable cost (S) and productivity (p). The size relation will change from 
c<s1 to c+e>s1. It appears to the source as if the amount of fix cost and 
degree of saturation has increased. This changes the behaviour of the 
source from “not giving” to “giving”.  
 
Emotions (hope, h) hide the true size of the loss (s1). The role of 
emotions in cooperation related behaviour has been addressed (Fessler 
and Haley, 2002). An alternative interpretation is that the whole space is 
deformed and the source differently judges the own position and the 
border between c<s1 and c>s1 and will give (Figure 6a). Giving will stop 
at c=s1. The size of the difference (c minus s1) determines how intensive 
education and hope have to be. Positive emotions conditioned through 
education and induced by the sink will trigger the interpretation that fix 
cost is high and productivity is saturated. Variable cost is costing and 
therefore given. Even the fix cost could be reassessed and parts 
transformed into variable cost and given to the sink, too. An objective 
loss is happily realized! 
 
Figure 6a 
 
Figure 6a. Education (blue arrow, e) manipulates the perception of the fix cost and 
giving (orange arrow) is induced. Hope (blue arrow, h, educational conditioning of 
endogenous reward systems) is induced and hides the true cost (s1) and giving is 
induced (short orange arrow). Education can also change the perception of the whole 
transfer space and induce giving (long orange arrow) directly. The red lines separate 
c>s1 and c<s1.  
 
Negative emotions: 
Hate is an example for negative emotions. Hate may involve two or three 
parties, one or two competing ensembles. 
Two parties: The action (e) of a sink may induce hate of a source. The 
source is moved from giving (c>s1) to not giving (c-e<s1) (Figure 6b). It 
appears to the source as if a part of the indispensable fix cost has been 
lost. This must be replaced by variable cost. The residual variable cost 
seems to be much more productive and has now an increased value. A 
highly productive substrate is not given away. The emotion hate makes 
the source evaluate the relationship between c, S and p differently. Also 
the transfer space could be deformed. Hate makes the source 
overestimate the size of the loss s1. 
Three parties: Hate is educational (through information; either true or 
false) induced by a third party in a source to avoid giving to a sink so that 
there will be more residual reserves for the third party or that the 
productive interaction between source and sink is disrupted. Less 
productivity will be an advantage to the competing ensemble the third 
party is a part of.  
 
Figure 6b 
 
Figure 6b. Education (blue arrow, e) manipulates the perception of the fix cost 
(amount or saturation) and giving ends. Hate makes the source overestimate the size 
of the loss s1. A different interpretation is an increased value of the variable cost 
because lost fix cost had to be replaced with parts of the variable cost increasing the 
value of the residual variable cost. The intensity of hate is direct proportional to the 
resulting size of the difference c minus s1. The red line separates c>s1 and c<s1.  
 
 
 
• Brute force, the surface c-s2: 
In cost efficient exploitation (s2>c) taking is cheap and effective for the 
dominant party (sink) but the subdominant party (source) may not be 
willing to give because the status there is not saturated anymore. Brute 
(counter) force will increase the cost of taking. The size relation will 
therefore change from s2>c to s2≤c+bf. Now the dominant party will no 
longer take because the border to costing exploitation is exceeded. Also 
here bf is a risky investment. Both sides may be hurt seriously. But once 
bf is effective cheap threatening will make the dominant party recoil from 
taking. Threatening evokes an emotion called fear to hide the true gain of 
taking (s2) (Figure 7). 
 
Figure 7 
 
Figure 7. At first brute force (bf, blue arrow) will increase the fix cost (c) for the 
dominant party. Not taking is induced at that relationship between cost and 
productivity (costing exploitation). Later fear (f, blue arrow) is sufficient. Fear hides 
the true gain s2. The red line separates s2>c and s2<c. In the described case giving 
back could be a result as the border s2=c is exceeded. A sink is turned into a source. 
 
A fight could be interpreted as a test which party is nearer to the border 
of giving/not giving – taking/not taking. Or: Who is more and who is less 
saturated? The minimal intensity of the counterforce is determined by the 
distance to the border s2=c. But it should be clear that in every 
production function the most left point is zero. At high saturation there 
may be low productivity but there is also endurance. s1 or s2=c+S+p 
could also be interpreted as a space with many different positions. 
 
• Education, the surface c-s2: 
Usually the exploiting party (sink) will educate the exploited party 
(source) to tolerate exploitation in hope (h) for a better ending. This may 
lead to exhaustion of the exploited party and a decrease of productivity 
of the whole ensemble. Ensembles with low productivity will be defeated 
by ensembles with high productivity. The highest productivity will be 
reached at optimal distribution of material and energy (substrates) 
between both parties so that both are combined maximal productive.  
Therefore, it could be in the interest of the exploiting party to restrain 
from complete exploitation of the exploited party. The birth of moral.  
Education as investment could originate in the dominant party but also 
within the subdominant party to change the behaviour of the dominant 
party. The size relation will change from s2>c to s2<c+e. The dominant 
party is changed from “taking” to “not taking”. The perception of size and 
saturation within the fix cost (c) is changed by education (e). Emotions 
(hope, h) hide here the size of s2, the possible gain and reward. A 
different idea is that the transfer space is deformed and the addressed 
party judges the position of the border between s2>c and s2<c differently 
and will not take (Figure 8a). Not taking will start at c=s2. The size of the 
difference (s2 minus c) determines how intensive education and hope 
(emotions) have to be to avoid taking. 
Positive emotions conditioned through education and induced by source 
or sink will make the sink differently interpret the degree of saturation in 
the fix cost. Variable cost is no longer taken from the source because 
this would decrease sink productivity due to erroneously assumed high 
saturation in the sink. In addition, the value of the fix cost could be 
reassessed and partially transformed into a variable cost and given. A 
loss of profit is proudly realized. 
 
Figure 8a 
 
Figure 8a. Education (e, blue arrow) manipulates the perception of the fix cost. Hope 
(h, emotions, blue arrow; an educational conditioning of the endogenous reward 
system) is induced and hides the true gain. Education can also change the whole 
judgment of the transfer space and the perception of the own position within that 
space (from s2>c to s2<c). In this case giving back (orange arrow) would be induced 
in the sink. The sink becomes a source. This change of perception may also be a 
natural result of aging and increased saturation beyond the period of growth. 
 
Negative emotions: 
Hate is a negative emotion. Again hate may involve two or three parties, 
one or two competing ensembles.  
Two parties: The action (e) of a source may induce hate of a sink. The 
sink is moved from not taking (s2<c) to taking (s2>c-e) (Figure 8b). Now it 
appears to the sink as if parts of the fix cost have been taken away. The 
indispensable fix cost must be replaced with variable cost. New variable 
cost will increase productivity. This new variable cost is taken from the 
source in hate. Alternatively the transfer space could be deformed. 
Three parties: Hate is educational induced in the sink by a third party to 
induce taking from a source to harm the source. This may have the effect 
that the source is overstressed and the productivity of the ensemble will 
decrease in a competitive situation between two ensembles.  
 
Figure 8b 
 
Figure 8b. Taking away or education (e, blue arrow) to hate manipulates the 
perception of the fix cost in the sink. Hate (blue arrow) is induced and overrates the 
true gain. Taking is induced (orange arrows). The red line separates s2>c and s2<c.  
 
• Harmful exploitation; the surface s2-s1 and the effect of brute force, 
education and breeding. 
As long as the source is in c>s1 the source will selfishly give to increase 
own productivity – in case a sink will take. This is an advantage through 
increased productivity to all sides: source, sink and the ensemble. No 
party is harmed or suffers. 
If taking by the sink is larger than the additional productivity through 
giving the source will approach c=s1. As soon as the source arrives at 
c=s1 further taking would decrease productivity of the source and 
therefore giving by the source will selfish end. The exploited party is at 
first lost to prisoners´ dilemma. A source also may be right from the very 
beginning of the contact in prisoners´ dilemma. If the sink wants to take 
in prisoners´ dilemma two possibilities exist. 
 
Exploitation with brute force, (s2-s1-bf>0) or (s2-s1-bf<0): 
Brute force (bf) is an investment of the exploiting party (sink) to induce 
giving by the source in prisoners´ dilemma. Fear (f) hides the true size of 
s1 but is imaginary (exists only in c-s1; c-s2) and is not added (Figure 9).  
Exploitation with education, (s2-s1-e>0) or (s2-s1-e<0): 
Education (e) is an investment of the exploiting party (sink) to induce 
giving by the source in prisoners´ dilemma. Hope (h, conditioned positive 
emotions. The reward exists only in the brain. c-s1; c-s2) is virtual and 
therefore not added (Figure 9). Hope hides the true size of s1. 
 
Figure 9 
 
Figure 9. The investments brute force (bf) and education (e) always contain a reward 
for the exploiting party. The red line separates now the area where the investment 
(bf, e) is overcompensated (>0, wise) and where the investment (bf, e) is not 
overcompensated (<0) by the gain through the transfer. The red triangle (c<s1) is 
prisoners´ dilemma (not giving) but giving is induced through brute force and 
educational conditioning. In the region s2-s1-bf<0 or s2-s1-e<0 quantity may be traded 
for quality even though the investment is not paid.  
 
The use of brute force and education changes the behaviour of the 
exploited party in prisoners´ dilemma from not giving to giving. But this 
behaviour is harmful and not reasonable. The productivity of the source 
will further decrease and then the source will be lost completely 
(physically) through extinction or consumption.  
In rare cases the source may be saturated and wants to give to optimize 
own productivity but the saturated sink does not want to take. Brute force 
or education (e.g. subvention, corruption) may also be used here to 
make the sink take although this is not reasonable. This will be harmful 
to the productivity of the sink and the ensemble.  
 
Why can it be evolutionary stable to take in prisoners´ dilemma?  
How can the loss of the exploited party be avoided? 
 
• Productive wise exploitation with brute force (s2-s1-bf>0): 
Brute force between different species:  
The transfer of the substrate between two different species may lead to a 
higher productivity of the ensemble so that the investment (bf) is 
overcompensated. This leads to productive wise exploitation with brute 
force and fear (s2-s1-bf>0). Wise refers to the fact that the gain will pay 
the investment including a reward. Brute force in enzymes is a higher 
affinity. In primitive organisms fear will be absent. The ensemble with 
such a behaviour will succeed against other not so productive ensembles 
of different species or single competing species. However, the source 
will suffer a decrease in fitness and therefore vanish. The ensemble may 
succeed against a competing party on the short run but it will only 
survive on the long run if parts of the gain are also used to breed the 
source. An example would be the leafcutter ant with the fungus grown in 
their garden. Parts of the living fungus are eaten (bf) but also bred (br). 
Leafcutter ants form the largest colonies of all ants. Grazing and hunting 
use brute force to exploit the source but usually no breeding of the 
source is observed. This leads only to predator-prey type stability (Lotka, 
A.J. 1920, Volterra, V. 1926, Prigogine, I. 1977). If the transfer is 
consumptive (s2-s1-bf<0) the dominant party needs continuous influx of 
exploitable individuals also but the ensemble-productivity is far below the 
sum of the single parties. The small reward to the sink may be enough to 
push through against a single competitor without an additional resource. 
Brute force within the same species:  
Naturally emerging asymmetries (male/female; young/old, strong/weak) 
may serve the same purpose as breeding. With every new generation 
the consumed sources are replaced resulting in a higher productivity of 
the ensemble of e.g. strong and weak. The increased productivity (s2-s1-
bf>0) comes from the species internal transfer. This could be called self-
exploitation. Every species produces surplus offspring. This surplus is 
partly consumed by disasters, diseases, predators and starvation. In self 
exploitation part of the surplus is transformed into e.g. more muscles or 
larger fat reserves or more offspring of the dominant animal. This may 
lead to a better survival or better competitiveness of the whole group 
against other groups but on cost of the source. 
 
• Productive wise exploitation with education (s2-s1-e>0):  
The transfer of the substrate to the exploiting party (sink) may lead to a 
higher productivity of the ensemble so that the investment education (e) 
is overcompensated. This leads to productive wise exploitation with 
education to hope (s2-s1-e>0). In this case the ensemble with such a 
behaviour will succeed against other not so productive ensembles or 
single parties. However, the educated party will suffer a decrease in 
fitness in c<s1 (prisoners´ dilemma). The ensemble may succeed against 
competitors on the short run but it will only survive on the long run if parts 
of the gain are also used to stabilize the exploited party. If the transfer is 
consumptive (s2-s1-e<0) the dominant party needs continuous influx of 
exploitable individuals also. This behaviour is not self sustainable and 
will only continue as long as no better competitors arise and the influx is 
constant. The long term physical loss of the exploited party in prisoners´ 
dilemma using brute force or education can be only counteracted 
through breeding. 
 
• Productive wise exploitation with breeding (s2-s1-br>0): 
All animals and man depend on an energy and substrate source. If the 
source is consumed completely the sink can no longer survive. Taking 
from a source will decrease the productivity of the source and finally 
consume the source. The source must be replaced if the sink will use the 
source further. Two possibilities exist.  
First: New sources must be found. This will only be the case when the 
source is produced somewhere else unhindered and unconsumed and a 
surplus leaks to the place where it will be consumed. Or the energy 
reserves are big enough to carry the sink there. This situation reminds of 
a predator-prey relationship in biology. This is the case (consumptive or 
productive exploitation) as long as breeding is absent.  
Second: The sink uses parts of the gain to replace the consumed source 
through breeding. Though the source is consumed, new source will 
replace the loss. This is called wise exploitation with breeding: s2-s1-
br>0, the essence of farming. The productivity gain (s2-s1>0, productive 
exploitation) is so big that besides a reward a reinvestment (br) into the 
stability of the source can be made. Due to the reinvestment breeding is 
not as much earning as complete exploitation but will last longer.  
 
• Several forms of productive wise exploitation, a comparison: 
When s2>>s1 there will be so much productivity generated that besides a 
reward for the exploiting party parts of the gain may be reinvested to 
stabilize the source. This is called productive wise exploitation (a special 
case of productive exploitation, Figure 10). Due to the reinvestment 
(productive) wise exploitation is earning less than productive exploitation 
in the same spot but it will last longer. The productivity gain to the system 
is no miraculous violation of mass and energy conservation. The gain is 
a result of the transfer of a substrate from a flat part of a production 
function (saturated, source) to the steep part of another production 
function (not saturated, sink).  
 
Figure 10 
 
Figure 10. At small fix and variable cost and high productivity (low saturation) in the 
sink and low productivity (high saturation) in the source the region of wise exploitation 
is in reach (blue arrow, 1). This region is also in reach by inventions to increase the 
leverage (2). At higher cost or higher productivity in the source or lower productivity in 
the sink only the region of productive exploitation (3) can be reached. But a reward 
will always be gained and the ensemble is more productive than the single parties. 
The size of the reward and the size of the necessary investment determine when 
wise exploitation will be reached. Productive exploitation is also in reach adding 
several smaller contributions from several sources (4). Finally at very high cost (or 
low cost and high productivity; s1=c+S+p) only consumptive exploitation is reached. A 
reward is still earned but here the productivity of the ensemble is below the 
productivity of both parties. In example 3, 4 and 5 the source must come from 
anywhere else to maintain the system. The red line separates s2>s1 from s2<s1. 
 
Breeding, brute force and education are different forms of wise 
exploitation. Breeding (s2-s1-br>0) is a long lasting investment of the 
exploiting party into the exploited party. This is driven by the gain from 
the transfer of the substrate to a better production function. Breeding will 
last many generations although wise exploitation is less earning than 
productive exploitation in the same spot. Pure productive exploitation will 
consume the source push trough against direct competitors and 
disappear when there is no source anymore. If both strategies are not in 
permanent contact and only in indirect competition reinvesting strategies 
win. In intelligent species exploitation will be detected very fast. Here - on 
the short run within one lifetime - brute force and education prevent the 
loss of the exploited party, too. The loss here is to be understood as 
entering prisoners´ dilemma (not giving). As long as the source exists it 
can be exploited repeatedly in hope and fear. This will harm the source 
and lead to suffering (decreased own productivity). This middle term 
strategy of exploitation may be also part of pure productive or 
consumptive exploitation. 
As long as there is influx of exploitable entities or self sustaining 
breeding, harmful exploitation starting in prisoners´ dilemma is 
evolutionary stable. 
 
• Productive wise exploitation within the complete transfer space: 
The three variables s1, s2 and c shape the transfer space. Within this 
space we observe self-ordering. If c>s1 giving will be no problem as 
giving will improve the productivity of the source. To give in avoided 
exploitation (prisoners´ dilemma, c<s1) would decrease the productivity of 
the source and is therefore not reasonable and will lead to exhaustion if 
induced by brute force or education. On the other side taking will only be 
observed if s2>c (cost efficient exploitation). Costing exploitation (s2<c) 
would lead to a decrease in productivity of the sink. Additional 
consequences are to be discussed: 
1. Taking not (s2<c) and giving deliberately (c>s1) are observed with 
high fix cost and high saturation. This is rare and will not lead to 
wise exploitation due to the high fix cost (Figure 11,1). The 
outcome of s2<c and c>s1 depends on the degree of saturation and 
on specific affinities. However there is also a small sector with low 
fix cost (Figure 11,2). 
2. Once giving deliberately (c>s1) and taking (s2>c) are combined the 
productivity of source, sink and the ensemble will increase very 
much (11,2). But taking will not end if saturation (s2<c) is not 
reached for the sink. The source will cross the border (c=s1) and 
then move on to prisoners´ dilemma (c<s1) (Figure 11,3).  
3.  Taking from prisoners´ dilemma (giving not) is attractive as fix cost 
is low (c<s1) (Figure 11,3). Only the use of brute force and 
education is able to realize this. The productivity of the ensemble 
will end when the source is consumed without breeding. But until 
then the ensemble is more productive. 
4. The subspace s2-s1-br-2c>0 (or s2-s1-br-2c-bf(-e)>0) is producing 
the surplus and long term stability to fuel co-evolution (Figure 11).  
5. The upper part and left part of the subspace of wise exploitation 
can be also under control of the sink. Then we observe “true 
symbiosis”. True symbiosis occupies partly the same space as 
wise exploitation assuming that the source can stop giving at c=s1 
and the sink is then no longer able to take (Figure 11, arrow 2). 
Wise exploitation is under the control of the sink, true symbiosis is 
under the control of the source. 
 
Figure 11 
 
Figure 11. In this example the transfer s1 to s2 is very effective (highly productive 
in s2), the blue arrows are very long. High fix cost and saturation will lead to the 
behaviour of giving deliberately, but even at high productivity the transfer will not 
reach the corner of wise exploitation as 2c has to be paid (arrow 1). At small fix 
and variable cost wise exploitation is in reach (2: s2-s1-2c>0; 3: s2-s1-br-2c-bf>0, 
s2-s1-br-2c-e>0). Giving will be deliberately and not harming in 2. Education and 
brute force have to be used to induce giving in 3 and 4. At higher cost or higher 
productivity in the source only the region of productive exploitation (4: s2-2c>s1) 
will be in reach. The investment (bf, e) is no longer paid (s2-s1-br-2c-bf<0, s2-s1-
br-2c-e<0 but quantity may be traded for quality. An example for consumptive 
exploitation is not shown.  
 
6. Matrix and Vector calculations would be an appropriate treatment 
(Figure 12) to understand the complete ensemble. 
 Figure 12 
 
Figure 12. In this graphical interpretation “giving” (-s1), “taking” (+s2) and fix cost 
(c) are the coordinates. Two vectors begin at the origin and point either onto the 
negative side of the transfer space (right side of the blue surface, consumptive 
exploitation, s2<Is1I) or the positive portion of the transfer space (left side of the 
blue surface, productive exploitation, s2>Is1I). The endpoint of the vector is 
determined by the size of s2, s1 and c (green lines). Superposition of all transfer 
spaces of all sources and sinks related to such single features forms the complete 
ensemble; a complex entity. This entity is easily recognizable as a body build by 
many cells but difficult to understand as a group formed by many individuals. 
 
• The decision process within a single economic entity: 
Individual economic activity is based on a double transfer, an 
exchange. For example money is exchanged for a good or a service. 
The central question to the subject is always: Does it pay? The 
judgment is not easy and secure as different objects on different 
baselines are to be compared and the value depends on time, 
changing emotions, additional information and many other factors. 
The productivity within the transfer space is not easy determined.  
Figure 13 compares different situations. To make it less difficult all fix 
cost c is of the same size and c is identical between giving and taking. 
Figure 13 
 
Figure 13. In this picture an economic subject gives (e.g. money – the same 
amount but at different productivity, A and B) to take a good or service of different 
values (C, D). The best exchange is AC. This is obvious as A as well as C are in 
the region “giving” and “taking”. But also the exchanges AD and BC seem to be 
productive (earning) although this is not obvious as D “not taking” and B “not 
giving” usually are to be avoided. BD is a consumptive (loosing) exchange. The 
easy observation of one or two sides of the transfer space is not sufficient.  
 
It remains doubtful that even the exchange AC will be realized as it is not 
clear whether 2c can be paid. The exchange BD will for sure not be 
realized in a reasonable subject. But external influence is able to deform 
the transfer space in a way that economic harm and unreasonable 
behaviour is the result, a consumptive transfer (Figure 14). It may appear 
that the surface s2-s1 is an objective criterion to judge the real value of 
the exchange to the observed subject or the observed parties. However 
this plane will also be deformed through information and emotion and in 
addition, this surface does not consider the cost as c is zero. Moving e.g. 
D along the c-axis (increase or decrease the fix cost content of the gain) 
will not change the result in s2-s1 (Figure 14). 
 
Figure 14 
 
Figure 14. In this picture the transfer space is deformed so that the subject will 
judge the side s1 “giving” and s2 “taking” as reasonable. Also the system view s2-
s1 looks now good (productive). Here the transfer BD will be realized. 
 
This surface (s2-s1) however has a big attraction as an argument. Many 
ideologies argue that certain individually harmful behaviours will be 
productive to the group, the country or the whole world. The interior of 
the transfer space must be understood. The simple observation of the 
surface is not enough. The transfer space is much more complex and 
has areas where unexpected outcomes appear, especially when the 
space is not linear. In addition there are many different transfer spaces 
within every economic entity. Sometimes unrelated transfer spaces are 
mixed, reasonable and coherent decisions are not to be expected in 
such cases. In general the final benefit (b) to cost (c) ratio for organisms 
and societies must be larger than zero (b/c>0) to lead to stability and 
growth. The benefit could be interpreted as the productivity (+p or -p) per 
used substrate (variable cost, S). The cost (c) is the total cost (fix cost) 
considering the degree of saturation there. 
 
• Arms race 
In an escalating arms race increasing amounts of productivity are 
invested into the ability to withstand brute force. These adaptations are 
costly (Dawkins R. and Krebs J. R., 1979).  The amount of indispensable 
fix cost (c) is increased for both sides. The source prevents “to give” and 
the sink prevents “not be able to take”. Both adaptations make the 
transfer space grow in direction of the c axis. More and more variable 
cost is transformed to fix cost. (The size of s2 and s1 may stay the same if 
there is an identical size relation in a symmetric arms race.) Increasing 
the amount of fix cost makes the degree of saturation larger there. High 
saturation is connected to low productivity of additional variable cost. The 
arms race will end when the value (productivity) of an additional 
substrate is smaller than the variable cost for this substrate. The arms 
race ends sooner or later in exhaustion or defeat. In a symmetric arms 
race the transfer space and saturating production functions may be for 
both sides very similar. A symmetric arms race should end when arming 
confers the same amount of advantage and disadvantage.  
We do not generally observe this. Between different species/populations 
the race may persist because the space looks different for both sides 
(asymmetric) and changes over the millennia.  
If the arms race between two parties does not involve a fertility race, 
fertility itself can be regarded as a variable cost paying the price of 
arming. Fertility under starvation is very often considered a variable cost 
in life forms with more than one broad season and care for the broad. 
After a missed breeding season there will be another chance. Sitting 
starved to death on eggs does neither help the eggs nor the breeder.  
• The external energy source 
All actions of life depend on the external energy from the sun (a few 
exceptions exist). The suns energy is collected by plants and handed 
over from consumers of different levels to man in the food chain. The 
loss of energy in each step is about 90%. The empirical law of mass and 
energy conservation is strictly obeyed on all levels! On each level of the 
food chain the residual 10% are handed over via consumption of 
generated surplus in form of offspring or offspring related products. Only 
two offspring per parents will survive statistically under stable conditions. 
The rest is consumed and transformed into productivity and activity of 
the next trophic level. Man is the final stage of the food chain (usually). If 
man invests all collected energy and substrates into offspring, density 
dependent problems will arise (aggression, disease, starvation). Man can 
also transform the substrates and energy into other activities 
(manufacture, construction, art, science, etc). But energy and material 
can be spent only once for physical activity or reproduction and related 
activities. Productivity will result either in offspring or in economic 
productivity or a mixture with less offspring and suboptimal economic 
productivity. The transformation process leads to a decrease in fertility as 
recently published (Myrskylä, M., Kohler, H.-P., Billari, F.C., 2009). The 
transformation process comes to saturation at an offspring amount 
between three and two as expected. A speed limit is reached when all 
substrate and energy determined to produce offspring is converted to 
economic activity. If all activity is transformed into economic productivity 
the productivity (productive exploitation, s2=max; No reinvestment into 
the stability of the source) will be maximal for a short while and then the 
population will break down if no influx of new exploitable entities follows. 
 
 
Interpretation 
 
Enzymes 
Enzymes are biological catalysts. Their production function is a 
saturation curve. The behaviour is predictable by thermodynamics and 
reaction kinetics. In a test tube their activity and productivity depends on 
external physical and chemical parameters (pH, temperature, substrate 
concentration, product concentration etc) and intrinsic features (substrate 
affinity, specificity, etc). Source and sink in the test tube depends purely 
on reaction kinetics. If a system of identical enzymes is not well mixed 
there may be local substrate concentration differences and therefore 
productivity differences. This system is not Pareto efficient. The 
combination of local substrate depletion (S+p>0) with potential high 
productivity and local substrate surplus (S+p<0) with low productivity will 
lead to a higher overall activity after mixing. After mixing differences in 
productivity are due to differences in intrinsic features. Now the system is 
Pareto efficient. Enzymes never give beyond the border to prisoners´ 
dilemma (c=s1; 0=S+p) in a well mixed solution. A thermodynamic view 
of economy has already been developed. (Eric Smith and Duncan K. 
Foley, 2005) Enzymes are important active building blocks of organisms.  
 
Organisms 
Cells and organisms are partially closed and not identically equipped. 
The enzymes in their bodies are in different states of saturation. This 
different degree of saturation leads to different behaviour. Only hungry 
animals graze or hunt. Many enzymes in their bodies are not saturated. 
Saturated animals will not graze or hunt because their enzymes are 
saturated.  
Brute force is a fact in animal societies. (Clutton-Brock, T.H., 2009 and 
Clutton-Brock, T.H. and Parker, G.A., 1995). Animals respond to brute 
force from other animals. They will not feed or mate and leave the 
opportunity to dominant animals. Brute force is an investment by the 
dominant animal and will not be used all the time as fear will be induced. 
Fear makes the subdominant animal obey. Brute force in intra species 
conflicts is generally observed and therefore evolutionary stable. What is 
the reason?  
Dominance is a result of mutual aggression and fight. Dominant animals 
have been successful in such conflicts. Therefore, their genes must be 
fitter. They are more productive (e.g. more muscles, faster reactions). 
Taking away food from weaker animals will only increase the productivity 
of the ensemble if: s2-s1-bf>0. This seems to be the case because we 
observe many species with this behaviour. Why is that so? The 
consequence of the law of energy and mass conservation is that mass 
and energy will stay either within one species/population or they are 
transferred to another species/population. Weak animals are either 
consumed partially or completely by another species (e.g. pathogen, 
predator) or they are “consumed” by their own species. This seems to be 
of advantage to ensembles with brute force as investment. Material and 
energy stay in the same species/population and are productive there. 
 
Organisms of different degree of complexity take care for their offspring – 
others not.  Infanticide with cannibalism is observed (Bluffer Hrdy, S., 
1979) – this is a surprise. Altruism is not generally observed and it is not 
dependent on complexity. Could there be another reason for genetically 
founded altruism? Highly productive organisms produce much offspring. 
They do not take care but sow the offspring. It would be expected that 
high productivity is connected to low saturation. Organisms with scare 
offspring invest the productivity not completely into the production of 
progeny. Therefore they are more saturated. In saturation the 
productivity of the ensemble of progeny and parent will become higher if 
material and energy is transferred from the saturated partner (parent, 
source) to the unsaturated partner (offspring, sink). Not only genetic 
tradition but also economics makes parental care under saturated 
condition a successful behaviour. Now we can interpret infanticide with 
cannibalism differently. The flow of material and energy is reversed when 
the probability of a successful investment due to a dangerous 
environment (stress) has become too low. 
The economic decision process in man has rational and irrational 
components. The rational decision to give or to give not (money, goods, 
help) and take or take not (money, goods, help) depends on the 
expected outcome (s2>s1 - get more than give away or s2<s1; the 
ensemble is here the individual simultaneously exchanging money for 
goods). The expectation is either realistic or not realistic. This depends 
on the quality and intention of the underlying information (cultural 
tradition, neutral or intentional information by others, etc). 
 
Societies  
Man seems to behave completely unexpected. Enzymes behave rational 
controlled by thermodynamics - man does sometimes not. Man does not 
have all information necessary and big parts of information given to him 
(cultural tradition, personal information by others) are systematically 
aimed to manipulate and disguise him. Education and emotional 
conditioning is able to modify the behaviour in a way that individual harm 
is the outcome. The group may have an advantage. Emotions are a 
product of man´s evolutionary history. They summarize complex 
situations (gut feeling) and are prone to be manipulated. 
The degree of saturation is difficult to determine in complex 
multidimensional systems. On the background of different genetic and 
informational equipment two parties with the potential to exchange goods 
meet. Both sides give and take, do not give and do not take. The fix cost, 
the variable cost and the productivity is different on both sides. 
Information of different quality (wrong by accident, deliberately wrong, 
partially right, right) is processed on the background of different 
educational conditioning and prejudgments. In addition the cost and 
productivity and the informational content change within time and in 
dependence of former decisions. The result is a complex, non linear, 
constantly changing space. The outcome of exchange decisions is partly 
rational and seems partly irrational with severe consequences for the 
individual and the group. A rational decision to give (optimize own 
productivity) may be wrong because the underlying information was 
intentional wrong to induce giving. Suffering of the source (biologically or 
personally) will give a reward to the sink and may foster the productivity 
of the group. Economic growth seems to be a transfer of material and 
energy from reproduction to production. The success of a group may 
relay on the suffering of individuals. But suffering of the source will not 
guarantee the productive success of the group – it may only serve the 
consumptive well being of the sink. As always in evolution - success is a 
feature of the successful - the timescale has to be observed. 
Emotions could be a by product of evolution. Emotions (fear, love, pride, 
etc) reduce the fix cost in the induction of giving, not giving, taking and 
not taking. A reduction of fix cost will increase the productivity of this 
group. 
The transfer space helps to understand the effect of brute force, 
education (motivation) and emotions in general but also purely economic 
phenomena like subvention or corruption are included.  
Summary 
 
A saturated source with usually high fix cost and low productivity will give 
voluntarily to a not saturated sink to reduce not earning variable cost and 
optimize own productivity. The transfer of a substrate from a saturated 
production function to an unsaturated production function leads to a 
productivity increase of the ensemble. This is called productive 
exploitation. The collective advantage may help that the ensemble will 
prevail against competitors. The productivity gain however is controlled 
by the sink. The source will give voluntarily until prisoners´ dilemma is 
reached. 
The asymmetry of the beginning and the control of the gain enable the 
sink to exploit the source further to completeness using brute force or 
education not to detect prisoners´ dilemma.  When the investment into 
brute force and education is overcompensated through the gain this is 
called wise exploitation. The sink will use the gain to exploit new sources 
as long as they are available. When all sources are completely exploited 
the system will collapse. Stability here is dependent on the continuous 
influx of new exploitable sources. This reminds of a predator-prey system 
in biology. 
A lasting, self sustaining stability is reached when the gain from the 
transfer is big enough to pay besides a reward to the sink the necessary 
reinvestment into the stability of the source. The source is preserved 
through breeding on the long run. This is also called wise exploitation. 
The reinvesting system will prevail against the exploiting system on the 
long run but not in direct confrontation. 
 
Saturation is a rare event in the real world, there rarely is Pareto 
efficiency. A source may also be already in prisoners´ dilemma and will 
not give. Here also brute force or education to not detect the loss may be 
used from the beginning to change the behaviour from “not giving” to 
“giving”. Starting in prisoners´ dilemma is attractive as the fix cost is low. 
The price is paid by the source and the gain is controlled by the sink. 
Productive and consumptive exploiting systems as well as sustainable 
systems in combination with breeding may originate here also. The 
reward in productive exploitation is always larger than in wise 
exploitation. Sustainable systems will only prevail in indirect competition 
as brute force, education and breeding are costly but last longer. A 
saturated sink with high fix cost and low productivity will not take 
deliberately. The reasonable sink will only take when it pays. But also the 
sink can be manipulated to take and harm own productivity. 
Classic game theory is only a small slice of a whole transfer space. The 
prediction and interpretation of behaviour on the basis of classic game 
theory must lead to confusing results and unexplainable observations as 
there are several more behavioural types than usually assumed.  
Unselfish or genetically founded altruism is no longer needed as an 
explanation to give. Self-interest motivates “giving”, “giving not”, “taking” 
and “taking not” equally. The central fitness aspect of an ensemble is the 
transfer of substrates from a source to a sink with a better productivity. 
Reinvestment of parts of the gain leads to ensemble stability. The 
increased productivity will lead to domination of weaker ensembles or 
single parties without additional resources. The transfer space is able to 
explain the effect of brute force and emotional as well as informational 
manipulation of source and sink. Besides the Nash equilibrium a stable 
island is described. Wise exploitation and true symbiosis form this 
subspace of the transfer space. For a long time selfishness and group 
selection seemed to be incompatible. The transfer space is a tool to 
understand exploitation and egoism based group selection. 
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